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deficiency ought to have been discovered 
under the provisions of s. 14A of the 
Limitation Act 1980, so as to allow the 
limitation clock to start ticking. The extra 
time and costs involved are likely to be 
substantial, particularly because in the 
light of such uncertainties, disputes and 
litigation on limitation are likely to 
increase considerably. This is, to say the 
least, worrying.
Nor, it might be added, can much 
comfort be taken, in this connection, 
from the Law Commission's recent
suggestions for reform of the law of 
limitation of actions (Consultation Paper on 
Limitation, No. 151 (1997)). For, 
although the commission rightly suggests 
that the date of accrual of a cause of 
action, with all its messiness and arbitrary 
character, should be downgraded in 
lavour of a standard limitation period of 
three years from the date of 
discoverability, the date of accrual will 
nevertheless remain very relevant. For 
the matters of which the plaintiff must 
have actual or constructive knowledge
would include (as at present) not only the 
facts of negligence and the identity of the 
potential defendant, but also the fact that 
the damage which has been suffered is 
'significant' (12.28ff ) and this throws 
the enquiry straight back to where it 
started   namely, when was loss first 
suffered. Plus ^a change ...  
Professor Andrew Tettenborn ***
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Taxation
Charges to stamp duty as consideration
by Janice B Shardlow
The imposition of a charge to taxation 
at a fixed point in time by reference to 
consideration inevitably causes 
complications where some of that 
consideration is contingent and 
accordingly may not eventually be paid. 
In the case of capital gains tax, a solution 
is found in s. 48 of the Taxation of 
Chargeable Gains Act 1992, which provides 
for an initial charge to capital gains tax on 
the basis that the contingento
consideration will be paid, with a rebate 
of tax should the sum eventually prove to 
be irrecoverable.
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In the case, however, of the somewhat 
'archaic' charge to stamp duty, dependent 
on submission of a document to the 
Inland Revenue and assessment of the 
charge on the document at the point of 
submission with reference to the 
circumstances at the date of execution of 
the document (Wm Cory <%_ Son Ltd v IRC 
[1965] AC 1088), the problem has been 
dealt with by the evolution of a principle 
generally known as 'the contingency 
principle'. In its simplest form this allows   
the Inland Revenue to charge ad valorem
duty on an instrument:
'not only by reference to any sum which is 
conditionally payable but also by reference to 
any sum which is payable contingently or 
conditionally, that is to say on a sum which 
may become payable' (Coventry CC v IRC 
[1978] STC 151).
In other words to assume the 
contingency will occur and assess on that 
basis. Due to the 'one-off nature of the 
tax there is no prospect of a rebate 
should the contingency not actually 
occur; on the other hand it also follows 
that no charge can be imposed by 
reference to consideration which is 
incapable of ascertainment at that date 
(IRC v Littlewood Mail Order Stores Ltd 
[1963] AC 135).
The contingency principle has 
gradually been extended over the years to 
deal with the situation where a 
contingent sum would appear to be 
unascertainable, in the sense that its 
precise amount cannot be fixed at 
execution, but it is nevertheless subject 
either to a maximum or minimum. In 
such an event the principle has been 
applied to levy a charge by reference to 
that maximum or minimum by taking it 
as a 'prima facie sum' or 'basic payment' 
(Independent Television Authority v IRC 
[1961] AC 427), contingently payable on 
the relevant contingency arising. A charge 
to tax has accordingly been levied, in 
effect on a double contingency, i.e. on the 
basis of two assumptions:
(1) that events will be such that a sum 
will be payable; and
(2) that events will be such that the 
sum will be equal to the stated 
maximum/minimum.
The recent case of L M Tenancies I pic v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division), 28 January 
1998) would appear to have taken the 
principle one step further, applying a new 
permutation, which it was initially 
thought would apply only in the case of a 
charge on periodic payments, to a single 
payment on a conveyance on sale.
STAMP DUTY ON LEASES
The case centred on the application of 
stamp duty to the consideration to be 
paid on two leases granted by St John's 
College, Cambridge, on 14 August 1993. 
In each case the lease provided that the 
tenant should pay an annual rent and a 
premium, each of which was to be 
calculated in accordance with a formula. 
In the case of the rent this was to be 
determined with reference to the net 
letting income of the property for the 
year in question, and in the case of the 
premium the formula was expressed to 
be an amount equal to 'a' x 'b', where 'a' 
was a specified figure and 'b' was the 
price of 13.75% Treasury loan stock at 
the close of business on the 25th business 
day following the execution of the lease. 
It was not disputed that the formula had 
in each case been adopted in an attempt 
to avoid stamp duty
The Revenue, in assessing the stamp 
duty to be charged under para. 3 of the 
head of charge 'lease or tack' on the
O
leases, agreed with the appellant that no
charge could be levied by reference to the 
annual rent, since it was impossible to 
ascertain any letting value as at the date of 
the lease. However they took the view 
that the contingency principle could be 
applied to the premium and assessed the 
premium to stamp duty by taking the 
closing price of the Treasury loan stock at 
1 3 August, i.e. the last working day prior 
to the date of execution, 14 August, 
which was a Saturday.
DETERMINATION OF 
PAYMENT
At first instance Carnwath J dismissed 
the appeal against the assessment. He 
held that the contingency principle was 
applicable not only where the instrument 
in question referred to a specific sum as 
contingently payable, but also where the 
money payable contingently under the 
instrument was to be determined by 
reference to an external factor and at a 
date after the execution of the 
instrument, provided that an amount of 
consideration could be ascertained in the 
circumstances existing at the date of the 
instrument by applying the formula as at 
that date. It followed that the amount 
chargeable in this case was the figure 
produced by applying the formula in the 
leases at the date of their execution.
In making his decision, Carnwath J 
accepted the appellant's argument that 
the principle stated by Lord Radcliffe in 
Independent Television, was correct:
'What is necessary is that it should be 
possible to ascertain from the agreement that 
there is some specified sum agreed upon as the 
subject of payment which may perhaps fairly 
be called the primajacie sum or basic 
payment.'
However, by applying the House of 
Lords decision in Underground Electric 
Railways Co of London v IRC [1 906] AC 2 1, 
he found that this was possible on the 
facts. The Underground case concerned 
the assessment under s. 56 of the Stamp 
Act f 891 of a periodical payment which 
was to be determined by reference to a 
formula. This was to be paid by the 
purchaser of certain assets as additional 
consideration and was to be determined 
each year with reference to the profits of 
the purchaser in that year. The stampable 
document stated that such profits were to 
be applied first to paying a 5% dividend 
to shareholders on the paid-up share 
capital of the purchasing company at the 
relevant time and then, to the extent that 
there were profits left, to paying as
further consideration for the sale, such 
sum as was equal to a dividend of 3% on 
such of the original ordinary share capital 
issued by the purchasing company as was, 
at that time, paid up. The House of Lords 
approved an assessment based on the 
minimum sum which would be payable, 
should there be sufficient profits at the 
relevant time, and on the assumption that 
the amount of the original issued 
ordinary share capital paid up at the time 
of the execution of the document would 
be the minimum amount issued and paid 
up at that time. Carnwath J stated:
'The importance oj this case ...is that the 
so called minimum sum or specified sum was 
ascertained not simply Jrom the terms of the 
agreement but by reference to an external 
factor namely the amount of capital actually 
paid up at the date of the instrument.'
In the Court of Appeal, Morritt LJ gave 
judgment for the respondents (Waller LJ 
and Sir John Balcombe concurring) and 
clearly rejected the appellant's 
contention that the contingency principle 
had been applied incorrectly on the basis 
that instead of identifying an ascertained 
and specified sum which the parties had 
agreed to pay on a contingency, the 
Inland Revenue had merely made an 
estimate of the operation of the formula 
by determining how it would operate 
immediately rather than in the future. 
Although accepting the fact that the 
immediate case concerned the charge 
under the heading 'lease or tack' (Stamp 
Act 1891, sch. 1) on the premium as a 
single payment, whereas the Underground 
case concerned a charge on consideration 
payable over a period pursuant to s. 56 of 
the Stamp Act 1891, Morritt LJ declined 
to accept attempts to distinguish the 
Underground case on the basis that:
(1) the value of the relevant Treasury 
stock at the time of contract was 
not, unlike the new company's 
existing paid up capital in the 
Underground case, an element in the 
future calculation required by the 
formula;
(2) the value of the relevant Treasury 
stock on any particular day was not 
affected by the acts of the parties to 
the agreement, whereas, in part at 
least, the amount of the company's 
paid up capital was.
His lordship accepted that these two 
differences existed, but did not feel that 
they were of such significance as to 
entitle him to refrain from applying the
principle established by Underground. It 
could not be said that the value of the 
stock on the date of the lease was totally 
unconnected with its value on the 
valuation date, and any fluctuations were 
likely to be within a narrow band. In 
neither case was there any formula so 
there was no importance in the 
statements made in Independent Television 
and by Brightman J in Coventry CC v IRC 
that:
'If, per contra, the form of the instrument 
is such that a sum is payable but does not 
name what that sum is, or what it may be, so 
that the sum could in theory be any figure, 
subject to due ai uantification by reference to 
some formula, then there is nothing by 
reference to which ad valorem duty can be 
calculated ... Accordingly the present issue 
was not for consideration.'
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords 
was refused.
Third contingency level
The case takes the contingency 
principle one step further by applying the 
'third contingency' level employed in the 
Underground case to a single payment, 
hence making it clear that the principle 
established in that case is of generalo
application. Accordingly it would now 
appear appropriate for the Inland 
Revenue to levy a charge to stamp duty 
on the basis of three contingencies, i.e. 
by making three assumptions:
(1) that events will be such that a sum 
\\ill be payable;
(2) that events will be such that the 
sum will be equal to a 
maximum/minimum amount;
(3) that events existing at the date of 
execution of the instrument in 
question will remain the same, and 
accordingly the maximum/minimum 
can be ascertained at the date of 
execution of the instrument.
Whether the third assumption can be 
said to involve a greater leap of faith than 
assumptions one and two is debatable. 
Lord Lindley, in the Underground case, was 
happy to reject arguments that such a 
calculation was merely an 'accident':
'The fact that the minimum sum is payable 
on more contingencies than one is in my 
opinion quite immaterial. '
The true import of the general 
application of this principle becomes 
clear when one starts to look at its 
application to particular factual 
circumstances. 21
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TRANSACTIONS IN LAND
The L M Tenancies case preceded the 
coming into force of s. 242 of the Finance 
Act 1994 which attempts to deal with the 
issue of unascertainable consideration in 
land transactions by providing that:
'Where ... the consideration, or any part of 
the consideration, for
(a) the transfer or vesting of any estate or 
interest in land; or
(b) the grant of any lease or tack,
cannot apart from this subsection be 
ascertained at the time the instrument in 
question is executed, the consideration for the 
transfer, vesting or grant shall for these 
purposes be taken to be the market value 
immediately before the instrument is executed 
of the estate or interest transferred or vested 
or, as the case may be, the lease or tack 
granted. '
The concept of unascertainabilty is 
itself defined for these purposes by
s. 242(3):
'For the purposes of this section
(i) the cases where consideration or rent 
cannot be ascertained at any time do 
not include cases where the 
consideration or rent could be 
ascertained on the assumption that any 
future event mentioned in the 
instrument in question were or were not 
to occur. ..'
Or, put another way, consideration is 
not unascertainable for these purposes 
where the contingency principle applies. 
Accordingly:
'the issues on this appeal remain of 
importance in the case of instruments executed 
after 7 December 1 993 , as well as those 
executed before that date, in determining 
whether, for the purposes of that section, the 
consideration cannot, apart from that section, 
be ascertained' (L M Tenancies case).
The Inland Revenue's view, expressed 
in their Tax Bulletin No. 30, August 1997, 
following the judgment at first instance, 
was that the principle in L M Tenancies 
would apply to other 'reference values' 
unknown at the date of execution of a 
document. In the context of rent this 
meant, for instance, that if the rent was 
subject to increase based on the RPI, 
then in stamping the document the 
Inland Revenue would apply the 
published increase in the RPI over the 
twelve months prior to the execution of 
the lease or agreement for lease, .to 
calculate the average annual rent.
It would appear therefore that, in their 
opinion, s. 242 will have a much more 
limited role than first envisaged, since the 
ability to make a third contingent 
assumption based on a reference value 
available should mean that it is rare that 
such consideration is 'unascertainable'. 
Only rent fixed by reference to a 
completely new factor, such as the rent in 
L M Tenancies itself, would appear to fall 
within the section. It is interesting to 
note that, since part of the consideration 
being unascertainable is sufficient to 
ensure that s. 242 applies, should a 
document in the form of that used in L M 
Tenancies be executed today, the entire 
charge would be based on market value.
Earn-outs
In the context of company sales, the 
increasing trend to defer some, if not all.o
of the consideration and to make that 
consideration dependent, at least to 
some extent, on the future value of the 
target company   such consideration 
being usually referred to as an 'earn-out' 
  will ensure that what appears to be 
'unascertainable consideration' will 
continue to be employed. From a capital 
gains tax point of view, such 
consideration cannot be charged to tax 
under s. 48 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 
1992, since it cannot be ascertained.
However, the case of Marren (Inspector 
of Taxes) v Ingles [1980] 1 WLR 983 
determined that a charge to tax could be 
imposed on the basis that the vendor was 
receiving a chargeable asset, namely a 
chose in action which was not a debt and, 
accordingly, a charge could be imposed 
on receipt of this asset and again at the 
point when a capital sum was derived 
from the asset on the realisation of the 
earn-out consideration. In practice this 
charge has rarely arisen since vendors 
have been able to structure their earn- 
outs to fall within the terms of Extra - 
statutory Concession D27, which has 
now been enshrined in statutory form in 
s. 138A of the Taxation of Chargeable 
Gains Act 1992, and enables the reliefs in 
s. 132 and 135 to be employed to avoid 
any charge until the shares or debentures, 
the subject of the earn-out, are 
themselves sold. The section applies 
where the consideration is such that 'the 
value or quantity of the shares or 
debentures is unascertainable at the time 
when the right is conferred' and s. 138A 
now provides a definition of
'unascertainable' for these purposes: 
' if, and only if
(a) it is made referable to matters relating 
to any business or assets of one or more 
relevant companies; and
(b) those matters are uncertain at that time 
on account ofjuture business of future 
assets being included in the business or 
assets to which they relate.'
Should the consideration not be 
ascertainable within this definition, for 
example, if the unascertainable element 
is referable to a matter unrelated to the 
business or assets of a relevant company, 
the relief is not available and one has to 
resort to Marren v Ingles in order to 
determine the charge. In a large number 
of cases the vendor seeking to structure 
the transaction to fall within s. 138A will 
refer to businesses or assets which in fact 
exist at the date of the execution of the 
document, and in doing so may well find 
himself in disagreement with the 
purchaser who will inevitably seek to 
relate the consideration to a formula 
which has no current day reference value.
In the stamp duty context it has, in the 
past, been possible, in certain 
circumstances, to convince the Revenue 
that the contingency principle should not 
apply to the unascertainable earn-out 
consideration, on the somewhat unusual 
basis that the House of Lords made it 
clear in Marren v Ingles that the right to 
that unascertainable consideration itself 
constituted a chose in action, not a debt. 
Accordingly it did not fall within the 
restricted definition of stampable 
consideration provided by the Stamp Act 
1891, namely it did not consist of cash or 
foreign currency, stock or marketable 
securities and did not fall within s. 57. 
The success of this argument did not 
appear to depend on the absence of a 
maximum or minimum, since its essence 
lay in the nature of the consideration 
being provided and it was accepted that 
such a maximum or minimum did not 
prevent the application of the Marren v 
Ingles charge. Presumably this argument 
will continue to be accepted and 
accordingly may serve to resolve the 
perceived tension between the interests 
of the vendor and the purchaser, until, 
that is, some enterprising person 
attempts to apply the L M Tenancies 
contingency approach within the context 
of capital gains tax itself.  
Janice B Shardlow
Lecturer, University of Wolverhampton
